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Characterizations of secure muhi-party symmetric and nonsymmetric ascade protocols are 
given. A simple correspondence problem over an alphabet is shown linearly reducible to the 
security problem of symmetric name-stamp rotocols. Also, the security problem of nonsym- 
metric protocols is shown linearly reducible to that of symmetric protocols. 
1. Introduction 
Public key encryption as used in network communication has been investigated 
extensively. The main advantage of the techniques developed in this area is the 
potential for secure communication. However, while public key systems are often 
effective in preventing a passive saboteur from deciphering an intercepted message, 
protocols must be designed to be secure when dealing with saboteurs who can imper- 
sonate users or send copies of intercepted messages. In order to avoid erroneous 
conclusions based on informal reasoning, Dolev and Yao [7] developed formal 
models for two-party protocols intended to be used for the exchange of plaintext 
messages. In terms of this model, they gave formal definitions of what it rnc?ns for 
a protocol to be secure and developed an elegant characterization f two-party sym- 
metric cascade protocols that are secure. They also developed a model for two-party 
symmetric name-stamp rotocols and showed that there is a polynomial-time 
algorithm (since improved by Dolev, Even, and Karp [6]) to determine whether such 
a name-stamp rotocols is secure. 
The purpose of the present paper is to extend some of the results of 
Yao to the case of multi-party protocols. The security of multi-party protocols was 
studied by Even and Goldreich [8], where they pointed out that the algorithm in [6] 
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can be used to show that there is a polynomial-time algorithm to determine whether 
a p-party name-stamp protocol is secure. By considering the underlying semantics 
of the model defined by Dolev and Yao, Book and Otto [4,5] introduced variations 
on the type of protocols considered. In [3] they introduced ‘nonsymmetric’ pro- 
tocols, protocols where the semantics do not allow the composition of the encryp- 
tion function of a user with the decryption function of that same user to be the 
identity, i.e., for every user X, DxEx is the identity function but ExDx is not the 
identity function. Thus, four types of protocols can be studied: symmetric ascade, 
nonsymmetric cascade, symmetric name-stamp, and non-symmetric name-stamp. In
this paper we consider the question of security for each of these four types of p- 
party protocols. 
For p-party symmetric ascade protocols, there is a characterization f security 
(Theorem 3.1) that is the obvious generalization of the characterization f secure 
two-party symmetric cascade protocols given by Dolev and Yao in [7]. However, the 
proof techniques developed here make the proof much simpler than that of Dolev 
and Yao. For p-party nonsymmetric cascade protocols, there is a characterization 
of security (Theorea 4.1) that generalizes the characterization f secure two-party 
nonsymmetric cascade protocols given by Book and Otto in [3]. 
Book and Otto [4] showed that it is not possible to characterize two-party secure 
name-stamp rotocols in the same way that secure cascade protocols can be 
characterized. They note that their proof can be easily extended to the case of da- 
party protocols and also to nonsymmetric protocols. Thus, the only methods that 
appear to be available for the study of secure name-stamp protocols are algorithmic 
techniques uch as those used in [6] or in [2]. While reasonable upper bounds 
(O(n3) where n is the ‘size’ of the protocol) are known for the complexity of 
deciding security [6], nothing is known about’ lower bounds. In Section 5 we con- 
sider a pobiem that we refer to as SPCP and show in Theorem 5.1 that for any 
instance of SPCP one can construct in iinear time ap-party symmetric name-stamp 
protocol such that the instance of SPCP has a solution if and only if the protocol 
is secure. Thus, Theorem 5.1 shows that any lower bound for SPCP is a lower 
bound for the complexity of determining whether ap-party symmetric name-stamp 
protocol is secure. The SPCP problem is solvable deterministically in time 0(n2) 
where n is the size of the instance and it is not unreasonable toassume that a lower 
bound for SPCP is O(nl+&) for some e>0. (However, we know of no existing 
publications describing work on this problem.) 
Finally, in Section 6 we show that the problem of security for p-party nonsym- 
metric name-stamp protocols can be reduced in linear time to the problem of securi- 
ty for p-party protocols that are symmetric. So, the latter is at least as complex as 
the former. 
In order to make this paper reasonably self-contained, the syntax and semantics 
of protocols are developed inSection 2. However, if the reader wishes to learn more 
of the motivation for the choice of definitions, he should see the paper of Dolev and 
Yao 171. 
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2. Definitions and uotations 
I29 
In 171, Dolev and Yao defin ode1 for two-party protocols for public 
key encryption systems. The basic structure of their model has served as a basis for 
the study of multi-party protocols, e.g., see [S] and [8] D The model studied here 
basically follows [S]. 
Let C be a finite set of distinct symbols. We use C* to denote the set of all finite 
strings composed of the symbols in 2, A denotes the empty string. Define 
C+ =C*- (A}. For any y&Z*, let It(v) be the set of symbols in y. Let [Sl be the 
cardinality of any set S and Iyl be the length of string y EC*. 
Let USER be a finite set of users where IUSER can be arbitrarily large. Let A 
be a finite set of symbols. Since USER is finite, one can encode the names of the 
users as strings in A * that for some fixed m >O have length m. 
The set I2onsists of several types of functions whose domain and co-domain are 
A *: 
(a) For XE USER, there is an encryption function Ex and a decryption function 
Dx- 
(b) For any wed*, if IwI zm, thenlet w= head(w)t where Itail(w)l =m. For 
any XE USER, there is a name-appending function ix where for w & *, 
ix(w) = WX (we use X for the code of X) and there is a name-matching function 
dx(w) = ;n;tr;ed 
There is an additionti function 
d(w) = 
head(w) 
undefined 
if tail(w) = X, 
otherwise. 
d defined as follows: 
if Iwlrm, 
otherwise. 
Let E={E,IXEUSER}, D={&IXEUSER}, I={i~~XEUSER}, and .I= 
{d, d*lXEUSER}. Thus I-=EWDUIUJ. 
A set T of cancellation &es on r is any subset of the union of all the relations 
described in (a)-(c) below, where X is any user in USER and 1 is the identity func- 
tion on A *: 
(a) DxEx= 1; 
(b) ExDx= 1; 
(c) dxix=dix= 1. 
Since A * is the domain and co-domain of every function in r, arbitrary composi- 
tions of functions from rare well-defined. We also as sume that there is no relation 
on the composition of functions from r except hose that result from application 
of T plus the normal associativity of composition and the properties of the identity 
function. 
Now we need the notion of ‘Thue system’. 
Let Z be a set of distinct symbols. f a, PEC*, then the c~nca~e~aGon of a a 
/? is denoted by q/I. 
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A Thue system on C is a subset T of C* x C*. Each (czr b) E T is a nrle. The Thue 
congruences generated by T is the transitive, reflexive closure of the relation y 
defined as follows: for (a, 1) E T and y, 6 EZ*, ya&+ y/M and y/M - @. The con- 
gruence cks of yeC* is [y]={&Z*IB$y}. If v?S and lul>lSl, then define 
y ‘f 6. A string y is irreducible if there is no 6 such that y ~6. T is Church-Rosser 
if every congruence lass has a unique irreducible string which is called the canonical 
form of each string in that class. 
If we consider the set of all compositions of functions in rP then from the stand- 
point of syntax, we can identify this set with P. A set of cancellation rules on a 
can be viewed as a Thue system T= ((yi, 1) 1 i = 1, . . . , t} on h: Since there are no 
relations on the functions in r* except hose that result from applications of the 
cancellation rules, if y and 6 are two different elements of r*, then y 8 6 if and only 
if for every A&d*, y(M) =6(M). Hence, if T is Church-Rosser, then for every 
y or* there is a unique irreducible string p EP such that for all A&d *, 
p(M) = y(M). ‘ = ’ means that either both sides are undefined or both are well- 
defined and equal. We will need the following fact. 
Prcllpesltion 2.1 [2]. If T is ap1y set of cancellation rules on r, then T is 
Church-Rosset. 
See [l] for a survey of properties of Thue systems that are Church-Rosser. 
Definition 2.1. The ‘generic’ p-party protocol is defined in terms of user names 
variables zl, Q, . . . . For ~12, let q, . . . , z, be p different user name variables and 
let z=(q, ‘.., z,). We will write ziez for i= 1, . . . ,p. For some in 1, let p be a func- 
tion mapping { 1, . . . , I} into { 1, . . . ,p}. Let $(.z) E !“‘& for each j = 1,2, . . . , I where 
for any XEUSER, rx= (Dx, d, EY, iy, dy, YEUSER}. Let P= {6”(Z)}j=l, then 
(P, p) is a p-party protocol with selector function p. 
Consider protocol (P, p) where P= {&j(z))::= 1. Then P has I phases. If user X 
wishes to initiate an exchange with P- 1 other users as participants, then he chooses 
an ordering of these participants plus himself, say Z= (Zr, . . . , Z”), such that &(I), 
z p(2)* l *- 9 ii!“(,) is the order in which the users Zi send messages and Z’(i) =X. The 
user X is called the initiator. The functions used in the exchange are o$?), 
j=l , . . . , I, where for each jl @j(Z) is the word on (rz, U l U rZ,)* obtained from 
tij(Z) by letting variable zi have value Zi, 1 I isp. Without 10~s of generality, we 
assume that each tij is such that @j(Z) is irreducible (see the remarks after Defi& 
tion 2.4). 
Let Ni(Z) = al(Z) and Nj(Z) = aj(Z)Nj_ r(Z) for 25 jll. When X wishes to 
transmit plaintext message M the messages xchanged are N@)M, .Y2(Z)M,. . , 
Nl(ip jM. 
1,2 ,...) 
.2. A protocol (P, p) Is a cascade protocol if rzr(j1= {DzM,,> U (Ez, i i= 
for j-1 ,..., A 
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Definition 2.3. A protocol (P, p) is a name-stamp protocol if rzM,, = {Dz,,.,} U
{&dzi,~z,d~~=l,2 ,..., p} for j=l,..., 1. 
Note that in a cascade protocol, only functions in EUD can be used. 
efinition 2.4. A protocol (P, p) is symmetric if the semantics are given by T= 
H&&V lh (EYDX, lj, (d xix, l), (dix, I) 1 X E USER), and nonsymmetric f T= 
((Q&X, lh (&ix, l), @ix, ~)IXEUSER}. 
Thus we can consider four types of protocols: symmetric ascade, nonsymmetric 
cascade, symmetric name-stamp, and nonsymmetric name-stamp. Nonsymmetric 
protocols were introduced by Book and Otto [3]. In each case, Tis a set of cancella- 
tion rules on r, so by Proposition 2.1, T is Church-Rosser. Thus for any y E r*, 
jj is well-defined. Let uZr*. We let IRR(r) = {p 1 y E t}. Consider a p-party name- 
stamp protocol (P, p) where P = (&!!(z)}$ = 1. We assume that for every sequence 2 
of users, every Ni(2!) is such that Ni(Z) is in (E U D U IU (d})*, i.e., the irreduci- 
ble form of Ni(Z) does not contain any occurrences of name-matching functions. 
The above assumption is called the name-matching function assumption. 
This assumption was made by Dolev and Yao {7]. But Even and Goldreich [8] did 
not make this kind of assumption. Book and Otto’s assumption [5] is even stronger. 
Let (P, p; be a p-party protocol. For each set R E USER, let rR = Ux,,rx and 
let ~(P,R)={ai(Z)lj~{2,...,l},Z=(Z1 ,..., Zp) with each Zi e R and r+ s imply- 
ing Z,#&}. Every element in C (P, USERj is called an operator word of <P, p). 
Definition 2.5. Let (P, cc) be ap-party name-stamp orcascade protocol. Call (P, p) 
insecure if there exists a set S of users and some y E (& U C (P, S U 2)) * such that 
~a#) = 1; here, 2 is an arbitrary set of p distinct users. The set S is called a set 
of saboteurs. The string y is called an insecure string. If (P, p) is not insecure, tnen 
we say (P, p) is secure. We will use C (P, 2) for C (P, SU 2) to simplify the nota- 
tion. The security problem is the decision problem of testing for security. 
The security problem may be viewed as a special case of a more general problem 
involving monoids presented by finite special (or monadic) Thue systems that are 
Church-Rosser. Giv ‘n such a monoid M and two finite subsets A and B of M, do 
there exist nontrivial elements a E M(A) and #E M(B) such that @I = 1, where 
@&(S)j _ _ i; ill;: s~Z~~~;~&~ SJ Iv, genei_&ed 5y A @)? TlRZa -aLI l rlnr;Anhlm lzad 8 1113 piuurem Is u~~AuuuA~~ A uoc 
algorithms for special cases are studied in [2,9, IO]. 
3. On thie security of pIparty symmetric casca rotocsls 
Dolev and Yao [7] have given an elegant characterization f two-party symmetric 
cascade protocols that are secure. This section will extend it to p-party symmetric 
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cascade protocols. Our approach to the proof is quite different from Dolev and 
Yao’s but much simpler. 
Throughout this section, ‘protocol’ refers to ‘p-party symmetric cascade 
protocol’. 
Let (P, y) be a protocol with P= {tZ#)}j= l. 
Definition 3.1. Let it EP and II E: IRR(P) in <P$ ~0. it is said to have the &&z&g 
JVOJWJ=~~ with respect o A E USER if DA r= 9@) i‘m@ies I& E It(a). 
Let S c USER. Define @s= (7~ Er* 1 IC E IRR(r*), It(a) n D G {DA} for some 
A E USER, and that if A $ S, then n has the balancing property with respect to A}. 
Proposition 3.1. For every yl, y2 E 9s, either yl y2 E gs or there exist 6, E gs and 
a2 E @,‘, such that Sl + 1, 6, is a prefix of yl and yl y2 = S,S,. 
Proof. If one of yl and y2 is 1, then we are done. Thus we can assume y~# 1, y@ 1. 
If s = yly2, then there is ;l.othing to prove, so assume G# ~1~2. 
If lt(y,) n D = 0 or lt(y2) 41 D = 0, then G ES~. Otherwise, there are Al E USER 
and A2e USER such that DA, E It(yr) and DA+ lt(y2). Consider cases. 
Case 1: AI=A2 and A@. Then yly+35s. 
Case 2: Al = A2eS. Let i4 = Al = A2, then either yl has a suffix DA ai yz has a 
prefix E’, or yl has a suffix Dj and y2 has a prefix Dj with r, s>O, since 
yly2#G. ‘Without loss of generality, we only consider the former. Let yr = qlDi 
and y2 =E’q2. Since yl E&, y2 E&Q, ql does not end in and q2 does not begin with 
any element in D. Since yl has the balancing property with respect to A, 
E&lt(ql). Therefore, G is qltt2 if s=r, 17~Di-‘q~ if s<r and q$i-‘t;z if sx. 
In each case, J$t E It(qr) so & E It(G). Thus, GE&. 
Case 3: Al +A,. Then there exist a prefix 6, of yl and a suffix a2 of y2 such that 
Y1Y2=442* 
Subcase 3.1: A@. Since DA+lt(yl) and yl E&Q, &‘$zlt(yr). Since A,+A, 
and It(y2) (ID = { gA2}, ItSA, in yl cannot be cancelled out by any symbol in ~2. 
Thus, &, E lt(Sr) and a1 #il. So 6r ES& If A2 ES, then Sl # 1 and 6r, 4 E@S; 
otherwise, by the same argument, f&e lt;Sa) and so $z E&Q 
Subcase 3.2: Al ES. If A2 ES, then a2 ~1~; otherwise, one can prove that 
Q E It(&) andi hcncc -‘--..--~ fi2 ~1~. Thus, either 671 =1 and yly2=62~1’ or 6,#1, and 
then &, a2~_IG. 0 
reposition 3,2.1J p GF$ then p E sr,*. 
l m= yR where y@Ks for i= 1,2, . . . ,n. Then we will prove that there 
with km such that $J= +&. 
Clearly the conclusion is true for II= 1. 
Suppose it is true for nI;m where m is a positive integer. 
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Consider yl, . . . , ym, ym+ 1 ES& By the hypothesis, there exist 6i, . . . , &E& with 
ksrvr such that yi=~~ym=+~9~. Let y=yl==eym+l, then 
*B=61~**~~-~~~ym+l=~1”‘~~_~~~ym+1~ 
By Proposition 3.1, there are only two cases. 
Case 1: 6kym+legs. Then the induction hypothesis applies to al, . . . , &_ 1, 
CQY, + 1 to yield the desired result. 
Case 2: S,V,+~=~~&+, where &E&, ~5;+~~9& ++& and &+l is a 
prefix of &. Therefore, 
Note that k+ 1 sm+ 1. q 
Since (P, /c) is a symmetric ascade protocol, for every y e IRR(r*), there is a -- 
unique irreducible y- ’ E r* such that yy -’ = y-‘y = 1. This will be needed in the 
proof of Theorem 3.1. 
Definition 3.2. Let (P, p> be a protocol such that P= {&j(z)}J= 1. We call (P, p) 
balanced if for every choice ofp distinct users Z= (Z,, . . . , Z”), aj(Z) has the balan- 
cing property with respect o Zp(j, for j = 2, . . . , I. 
Remark. We emphasize that aj(Z) E IRR(r*) for j = 1, . . . , I. 
Theorem 3.1. Let (P, p) be a protocol. Then (P, pl) is secure if and only if for every 
choice Z= (Zl, . . . , Zp> of p distinct users, 
(1) lt(al (2)) n E# 0, and 
(2) CP, p) is balanced. 
Proof. Suppose (1) and (2) hold but (1D; +# is insecure. Then there exists a set S of 
saboteurs, a choice of p distinct users Z= (Z,, . . . , Z’) and y E (Ts U C (P, 2)) * such 
that 7 = a[ ‘(2). 
Recall ss in Proposition 3.1 L & E gs. By (2), C (P, Z) E &. So y ES;. By Pro- 
position 3.2, p E Sz so a; ’ (2) E S$ Therefore, a; ‘(2) must have the balancing 
property with respect to any A E USER - S. We will prove that this is not the case 
and obtain a contradiction. 
Consider cases. 
Case 1: &@t(al(Z)) for some j#p(l). Then &@t(cr@?i_‘). But 
Dz:, $ lt(al (Z)- ’ ), and al(Z)- ’ does not have the balancing property with respect 
tO Z” E USER - S. 
Case 2: lt(al(Z)) n E c_ {Ez, 1. Then Ez, E lt(a,(Z)) by (1). So al 
some r>O since a,(Z) E IRR(r*). But al(Z)- ’ 
the balancing property with respect to 2, E US 
Suppose (P, ~4) is secure. 
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If (1) is false, then q(Z)=@, for some y >O. SO Cri ‘(Z)=E& E (&U C (P, Z))*. 
Thus (P, p) is insecure, a contradiction. 
Now assume that (1) holds but (2) does not. Then there exists some i and some 
choice of p distinct users Zsuch that Cri(Z) does not have the balancing property with 
respect o Z&i!, i.e., Dzfiii: E It&(Z)) but Ez,,,,, $ lt(Ui(Z)). For any ZjE 2, define 
Z(~)=(s~,s~,...,~~~~~_~, Zj,s~(i),...,s~_l)whe;e{sk, k=l,2,...,p-1) isachoiceof 
p- 1 distinct elements of S. Since Dzj E lt(@( j))) and Ez,$ lt(a@( j))), a@(j))= 
qjDzjcj such that lt(qj> U ltcri, E {E, 1 s E S} U { Dz,} . Hence lt(q,l ‘) U lt({,T ‘) c 
{D&S} U {Ezj} G&. So vi1 and {il are in rz. Therefore, 
v,~ ‘a#( j))&F ’ E U C (P, Z) 
> 
* and Q,‘ ‘ai(Z( j))c,T ’ = Dzj. 
Now let al(Z)=wlw~-w, where w&N {Dz,} for k= l,..., m. For 
kE{l,..., m ) , define 
)3k= 
if wk=Dz,, 
if Wk=&. 
J 
Let ~=b3~--b3,. Then y E (&U C (P, Z))* and yal(Z) = 1. By the definition, 
(P, p) is insecure, a contradiction. q 
Remarks. Theorem 3.1 is the natural cx t~rrsiorrr of Theorem 1 of Dolev and Yao [7]. 
In order to prove ohat result, Dolev and Yao introduced the set of all strings in r* 
which have the ‘linkage’ property. Denote this set by L. They proved that if n E L, 
then il E L. Instead of L, we introduced the set J& (see Proposition 3.1) to prove 
Theorem 3.1. We also proved that if II E @, then R E@&‘&‘. However, we have the 
fact that @;T L. For example, 6 = DYExEYD+ L -@$ for X, YGUSER and 
x* Y. 
Obviously, the characterization f secure protocols given in Theorem 3.1 can be 
checked by an algorithm that runs in linear time. Thus, we have the following result. 
Corollary 3.1. There is o linear time algorithm to solve the security problem for p- 
party sym.metric cascade protocol. 
4. On the security of p-party nonsymmetric cascade protocols 
Book and Otto [3] have introduced a model of nonsymmetric cascade protocols 
and given a characterization f those two-party nonsymmetric cascade protocols 
that are secure. Here we will extend this characterization to p-party nonsymmetric 
cascade protocols. 
Let (P, 11~) be such a protocol with P= (Gj(Z)}j= 1. 
efinitions 3.1 and 3.2, we can, for ( pj, define a string in IRR(r*) 
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that has the balancing property with respect o some user in USER, and define a 
balanced protocol (P, p) . 
Proposition 3.9, applies to nonsymmetric as well as symmetric protocols but the 
proof must be modified. Specifically, Case 2 must be replaced by the following. 
Let A 1 = Az =ri e S. Then y1 has a suffix DA and y2 has a prefix Ei with y, s> 0 
since JQ~~#~ and (P, p) is nonsyml~etric. Since y1 E$FS and DA E lt(~~), 
&‘A E lt(yl). But since EADA # 1, the occurrence qf E’ in y1 cannot be canceled by 
any occurrence of DA in ‘yz. Therefore I?A E: G and GE @s. Cl 
Just as in Proposition 3.2, if y E $@, then j& @z. 
Book and Otto [3] have given a characterization of two-party nonsymmetric 
cascade protocols that are secure. The following theorem extends this characteriza- 
tion to p-party nonsymmetric cascade protocols. 
Theotern 4.1. Let (P, I;L) be a protocol with P= ~~~(z)}~=~. Then(PS p) is secure 
if and only if for every choice Z = (Z,, . . . , Zp) of p distinct users, either 
(a) lt(q (Z)) f? 1) # 0, or 
(b) lt(cr#?)) n D = 0 and (i) and (ii) hold, where 
(i) for every iE (2, . . . , r >, q(Z) has the ~ul~~~ing property with respect o 
ZPtiI or q(Z) contains a factor DzJ3zj with j#&i), and 
(ii) it(~~(z))n~#0. 
Proof. The proof is much in the spirit of the proof of Theorem 3.1. Suppose (a) 
holds. Then &, E lt(q(Z)). For any y E r*, yq(Z) # 1 since &,Dz, # 1 implies 
that the occurrence of &, in al(Z) cannot be canceled by any symbol in y from 
the left. Therefore, (P, CL) is secure. 
Now suppose lt(c@)) n D = 0 but (b) holds. If (P, cc) is insecure, then phere x- 
ists y E (TsU C (I$ Z))* where S is a set of saboteurs, uch that 3 = 1. We will 
derive a contradiction. 
It is easy to see that y cannot contain a factor D#‘JJ with A, &USER and 
A #B. Assume, to the contrary, y = 6&,&“~& for some A E USER, BE USER and 
A Mtt Then, by part (i) of (b), y E (& U H)* where H= {n E C (P, Z) 1 R has the 
balancing property with respect o any A E: USER - S}. This implies that jj must 
have the balancing property with respect o any A f USER - X Since (b) holds, 
lt(q(Z)) C_ E and EA E lt(q(Z)) for some La E USER - S. Since yal(Z)= 1 9 
~&Q(Z)= 1. Therefore It(y) s D and DA E It@), so jj does not have the balancing 
property with respect o A E USER - S, a contradiction. 
Now suppose that (P, p) is secure and lt(q =0. We will show that (b) 
must hold. Part (ii) of (b) ‘holds for otherwise (P, @ is insecuree 
If part (i) of (b) does not hold, then there exists some iO E { 2, l . . , I) such that 
~~~(~) neither has the balancing property with respect to nor contains a fac- 
tor Dz~,,#?~~ for some j#p(i& ence, either aio 
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x+ {Z,, 22, l ** I Zp} - {Z”tio>> and h >O. NOW for any 2” E 2, define Z(j) = 
6 19 •*~,~p(io]-l, 2'3 Sp(i,+ l..,s~-& where (~1~ . . ..+l) is a choice of p-- 1 distinct 
users in S. Define qj and 4’ 8s foltlows: 
if ai&Z( j)) = E, l EYkD& 
otherwise, 
and 
It is easy to see that u&Z(j)), Q and {’ are all in (&U C (P, 2))” and 
ftj R&W))tj = 4i!j* Now suppose ~t(Z)=~r-w~ where wjeE for i=l,...,m 
since lt(czi(Z))nD=0. For in { 1, . . ..m}. define 
$j= tlja&Ki)~~j~ 
if Wi=Ezj, for some je(l,...,I}. 
Let y = #m-e Gi. Then y E (&U C (P, ST))* and ~a&?) = 1. Therefore {P, p) is 
insecure, a contradiction. Cl 
Corollary 4.1. There is a linear time algorithm to solve the security problem for a 
p-party nonsymmetric cascade protocol. 
5. On the secwity af p-party symmetric name=stamp protocols 
In this section we will discuss p-party symmetric name-stamp protocols. 
As seen in Section 3, we can use Theorem 3.1 to give a linearatime algorithm to 
solve the security problem for p-party symmetric ascade protocols. However, no 
such elegant characterization has been found for symmetric name-stamp protocols. 
It was shown in 141 that there is no ‘simple’ characterization f name-stamp pro- 
tocols that are secure. On the other hand, Dolev, Even and Karp [6] gave a 0(n3)- 
time algorithm to solve the security problem for two-party name-stop protocols, 
and Even and Ooldreich [8] extended it to the case of p-party protocols. 
From now on, we use the term SNS for the security problem for two-party sym- 
metric name-stamp protocols and SPCP for the simple post correspondence pro- 
blem, defined below. Then the goal of this section is to show that SPCP can be 
reduced in linear time to SNS. It is reasonable to conjec;ture that Oln’+‘) (&>O) is 
a lower bound for SPCP and thus is also a lower bound for SNS. 
Definition 5.1. Let C be a finite alphabet with Ic( = 2. Let @, pi EC+ for i = 1 s **a 9 I. 
Then the following problem is called a si~p~ep~st c~rresp~ndencepr~b~e~ (SPW:
Qmstion: Is there a sequence (pi,, a . . ,&J E {/Z&l i= 1, l . . 9 I} such that &, l *efli,,, = 
fi3 . 
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We will use Cp, j?, I) to denote this problem. 
Notice that there is a sequence (pi,, . . . ,P,) > {pii i= 1, . . . , ii such that /?i,~+,=~ 
ifandonlyifbisin {flili=l,...,I)“. Now (piliz , . . . , I) is a finite set of strings 
and kom {&Ii=1 , . . . , l} one can easily construct a nondeterministic finite-state 
acct bptor for {pi 1 i = 1, . . . , l} * having size 0( 1 I= 1 I&l). Thus, SPCP is decidable in 
time O(lPI(C~=i Ipil)). 
We want to establish the following result. 
Theorem 5.1. There exists a linear-time algorithm which can, for any SPCP 
(j?, #, I), fmd a two-party symmetric name-stamp protocol (P, p) such that 
c/3, /I, 1) has a solution if and only if (P, ~0 is insecure. 
Proof. Let C= {bi, &} and A, &USER with A H3. Define mappings fA, B and 
x4;; from C into r* as follows: 
fA B(bj)=DiEiDiii and fi’,(bj)=d’EiDLE{ I 9 
for bj E C. Extend ji, B and fA; L to mappings over C+ in the natural way, i.e., for 
It= bi,bi2*** bi,EC+ , define 
and 
fA, B(n) =fA, B(bil)fA, B(bi$ l “fA, B(bi,,,) 
fAl~(n)=fA7~(bi,lf~fs(bi~_,)~‘mf~fs(bi,)w 
Of course, fi,&)fA, B(n) = 1, but fA, B(n)fi L(K) # 1, for n EC+. Furthermore, 
fA, B(n) E IRR(T*) and fx&) E IRR(T*). If x and y are two different user name 
variables, we can define the mappings from C+ to (EA, DA, iA, d [A is x or y} * in 
the same way. 
Now let a SPCP <pR, ,W 1) be given. Define a two-party symmetric name-stamp 
protocol (P, j4) as follows: 
P= { tij(Z)}$L :I p(i) = 
2 if i is even, 
1 otherwise 
r; is easy ?;o verify that (P, p) is indeed a two-party symmetric name-stamp pro- *&. _ 
tocol, especially that (P, p) satisfies the name-matching function assumption, since 
fA, B(n) and fA; b(K) are in (r- {dxl xe USER}} * for all A E‘ USER, BE USER and 
7VZC+. 
Let us prove that if (1, /I, 1) has a solution, then (jP, fl j is insecure. 
Since (pI /I, 1) has a solution, there exists a sequence (pi,, . . . , pi,,,) c {pi, i = 1, l . . , 
1) such that pi, +?i,, = p. Let Z= (Z,, Z2) be a choice of two distinct users. 
that fi,, z2 is a homomorphism from C+ to r”, SO we have fz,, z,(&,) l fz,, zr(p,i,,,) = 
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fi,,z2(/J)=al(Z). On theother hand, for any jc(l, . . ..I}. defineZ(j) to be obtained 
from Z by interchanging Zfl(i+21 and Zr, ZPti+ rI and &. Let y =cui,+ r(Z(i,,&*= 
$, + 1 WI 1) g Then Y = f~,'&(rsi,) l l •fZ~,‘z,(Bi,) bY (2)- Therefore 
Note that cri,+l (Z(#E C(P,Z) for jE{l,..., m), so y E(&U C(P, Z))*. But 
yar (2) = 1, therefore (P, p) is insecure. 
We now prove that if (P, p) is inseb _;x, &e=rl </I, /I, I) has a solution. 
Since (P, p) is insecure, there exists a y E (& U C (P, Z))* for any choice of two 
distinct users Z= (Z1, Z2), such that ya@)= 1. Let y’ be any one of such y that 
has the minimum length. We shall prove that if tq(Z)=f~,,&J), then y’= 
fz,‘z,(Bi, l **piJ for some sequence {pi,, l . . ,fli’,,} E {flil i= 1, l ** ,I}* Thus fi= 
Bi, -*-Ipi, since fi,, zz is a one-to-one homomorphism. AS a result, (8, p, I) has a 
solution. 
We shall prove this by using induction on l/31 with the aid of the following fact. 
Fact. y’=~;fi-,,‘Z,~i) fOrsame iE{l,...,l}. 
Proof. Let p= bib’ for some bj E 2, SO a1 (2) =fi,, z,(bjb’) = Di, Ei2Di, iilfi,, zz(P’)* 
E, must cancel some occurrence of Dz, in y’ since y’crr(Z)= 1. But this occurrence 
of Dz, can only appear in some operator word in C (P, Z), say Qj(Z’), where 2’ is 
some choice of two distinct users, i.e., y’= Y;aj(Z’)S. We want to show that 6= 1 
and aj(Z’) = fi,, z2@i) for some i E ( 1,2, . . . , I}. Since some occurrence of Dzz in 
aj(Z’) cancels the occurrence of Ezz in al(Z), we have for some A E USER 
y; ajd kEjD$2 EjfaytS D$?i2Di, ii, fi,, z2(lp’) = 1 (3) 
v_ 
iZj(Z') 
q(z) 
where one Dz2 in D& must cancel one Ez2 in E& Since dk in (3) must be canceled 
by some name-appending functions from the right, the Ei adjacent o dk and the 
D& adjacent o ii, must completely cancel each other, so A =Zr and k= j, and 
aj(Z’)= f&,‘z,(pi) for some i E { 1, . . . , I}. Thus (3) becomes 
Also aja = 1 where ai”= fi;,$,(#) for some &EC*. 
First note that t5 t‘ 1 s . r* For otherwise, 6 must contain some operator word in 
C(P, Z). If we let fi ;(a,,> be the rightmost occurrence of such words, then S= 
a,fA Ig(jpiO)& with 82 k I--. Sin,: Q= 1 and fff’- b(bi,J begins with d, fi Ig(pi,.,) must 
cancel some prefix of &. Let 6’ be the r 
9 , 
nm&m;m~ m.ar) nf A mftar thn rslnodatkn* bAi&bAaArairC, yur . v1 v aawks c1s.i rrirmbwrru&AvAa) 
then 19’1 c IS( and S’E(I&J C(P, Z))*. Now by replacing the S in y’ with 6’, we 
would obtain a new insecure string of length shorter than y’, a contradiction. 
Since y’ has the minimum length and y erz, & 6. 
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Finally note that G$‘= 1. For otherwise, aTwould contain some factor dkE~,D$$3$, 
with some k> 0. Since 6 E Z$ Ei, would not be canceled by factors of 6, so 
$8~ 1, a contradiction. 
Therefore 6 = 6= q = 1. So y ‘= y;a$Z’)fi = y&&#3&. This completes the 
proof of Fact. q 
We now prove y ’ =f&,‘z,(pi, .**P,,) by using induction on l/?l. 
If ,@= +Z’, then Fact shows r; = 1 since y’ is the shortest insecure string, so 
Y’ =fi;.‘Z2(Pi ). 
Assume the induction hypothesis for l/J1 =n. Now let lfll =n + 1. By Fact, 
Y’= V;J~~,‘Z,(~i,). Since Y’ai(z) = Y’fz,, z,(P) = 19 P=Pi,P’* SO 
Y ;fi,‘Z,(B’) = V;fi;,lZ,(rei,)fZ, Z2(/$)fZ~, Z,(B) = Y’al(z) = l l 
Consider a new SPCP <p’, p, I) and its corresponding SNS (P’, p) as defined in 
the beginning of the proof. r; is an insecure string of the minimum length for 
(P’, p) since y’ is for (P, p). Furthermore, IS’1 < lpl, so l/3’l ZUZ. Now by the induc- 
tion hypothesis, r; =fZ~,1Z2(~i2~**~im) for some sequence (pi, l ,fli1) E {/?I, l d& 
Therefore 
This completes the induction. 
NOW we can conclude fl=a,piz...fiim. 
It remains to show that for any (j$ /I, I), we can effectively construct (P, p) in 
linear time. The algorithm can proceed as follows. 
First, write down the reversals of { &, . . . J,}, denoted by pf, . . . ,/?T where the 
reversal of any n = bi, . . . bi, EC” is z*=_bi,... ei,. Then rewrite p, p;‘, . . . , /JT as 
follows: any bj in p is replaced by D& Ej2 D& and any bj in /?; is replaced by 
diE~~(k+gD~~(L+I~E~~(li+2~. 
Note that as i in p(i) goes in the order I, 2, . . . , I+ 2, we can compute 
AI), /@), . . . 9 p(l+ 2) successively in real time. 
It is easy to verify that the above algorithm can be done in Q(n) time where n is 
the total length of fl, pr, . . . , &, either using multitape Turing machines or Raw 
machines. 
This completes the proof of the theorem. 0 
The ‘obvious’ naive algorithm for solving SPCP (fl, 0 has a lower bound 
0(n2) where n =( Ei,, Ipil)+ IPI. It is not unreasonable to assume that a lower 
bound for SPCP is O(n I+‘) for some e > 0. Let us make it a conjecture and call it 
the ‘SPCP conjecture’. Now we give the following corollary to Theorem 5.1. 
5.1. [f the 23PC.F conjecture is true, then (n’ +‘) is Q lower bound for 
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Since SNS can be regarded as ap-party symmetric name-stamp protocol for any 
p> 2, Corollary 5.1 also implies that, for any fixed p> 2, O(n’ +&) is a lower bound 
for the security problem for p-party symmetric name-stamp protocols, if the SPCP 
conjecture i:i true. 
6. NSNS is linearly reducible to SNS 
From now on, NSNS is used to refer to the security problem of p-party nonsym- 
metric name-stamp protocols and SNS to the security problem of p-party symmetric 
name-stamp protocols. 
Our goal is to prove the following theorem. 
Theorem 6.1. There exists a linear-time algorithm which takes a p-party nonsym- 
metric name-stamp protocol (P, p) as an input and then produces a p-party sym- 
metric name-stamp protocol (P’, p) as the output such that (P, p) is secure if and 
only if (P’, p) is secure. 
&mark. The theorem says that NSNS is not harder than SNS. 
Now let (P, p) be as in the theorem. For any CT Er*, & denotes the canonical form 
of CT with respect to the semantics in (P, p). To prove the theorem, we need some 
preparatory work. 
Definition 6.1. Let f be a function from r to r*, defined as follows: for any 
AEUSER, f(EA)=EAiA, f(DA)=dDA, f(iA)=iA, f(dA)=dA, f(d)=d. Then extend 
f to a homomorphism on r*. 
Proposition 6.1. Let x E I? Then f(R) =f(z). 
Proof. If it = 1, the result holds. Otherwise, z = a1 l 9.a~ with a+ r. We use induc- 
tion on n. 
For rt = 1, the proof is trivial. 
Now consider n = 2. It is easy to verify that for any a, b EI’, 
(1) ab= 1 if and only if f(a)f(b) = 1; 
(2) a# 1 if and only if a = ab if and only if f(a)f(b) =f(a)f(b). Therefore, 
f(a) = f(ab). 
Assume the result for nrm. Let n =m + 1. Consider cases. 
Case 1: There exists some i such that aiai+ I= 1. Then by (l), f(ai)f(ai+ 1) = 1. 
Therefore 
(3) f(n) = f(a, l ** a~)=f(a+*f(ai)f(ai++-f(a,) 
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Note that we have frequently used the fact that f is a homomorphism. So by the 
induction hypothesis and (3), 
Case 2: z = R. Then 
(4) f(R) =f(N =f(a+-f(a,). 
On the other hand, f(n) =f(a+f(a,). But 36 EIRR(rl), SO t+ai+ l # 1 for i = 
1 9 .=.,n- 1. Hence by (3, f(ai)f(ai+I)=f(ai)f(ai+I)g Since f(gi)#l for i= l,...,n, 
we have f(n) = f(al) l -f(a,)) =f(al) l f(a,). This together with (4) yields f(R) = 
f(Jo* 0 
Now let z be p distinct user name variables (note: zQ: USER) such that 
z=(zr, l **, a,). Extend f to {E,+ DA, iA, dA, d 1 A E z} * in the obvious way. Let 
(p, p) be a symmetric p-party name-stamp rotocol obtained from (P, 110 by 
replacing each dii(z) in P with f(dii(Z)) denoted by &(Z). SO P= {&(z)}i=r if 
P= {&i(Z)}f=r* Then for every choice of p distinct users Z= (Zr, . . . , Z,), pi(Z) is 
defined in the same way as Cri(Z) in Section 2 for i E { 1,. . . , I). We emphasize that 
the semantics of (p, p) are different from that of ! P, p) because the former is sym- 
metric but the latter nonsymmetric. See Definition 2.4. Suppose the semantics of 
(P, p) are given by T, and that of @, p) are given by T’. For any II E r*, we use 
?I for the canonical form of n in T 8s before but ffr for the canonical form of ;TI 
in T’. 
Proposition 6.2. For any n or*, f(lr) = f(71) ? 
Proof. We can assume that n#l. Let x=ala2-a, with aiErfor k{l,...,n}. 
If rll= 1, the result holds. 
Let n =2 and a, b EK By the definition of f, if a#& and b # DA for some 
A E USER, then f(ab) =fm? Now let a = EA and b = DA. Then 
We assume the result for nrm. 
Let n = m + 1. The proof is exactly the same as the corresponding part of the proof 
of Proposition 6.1 except h.at here we need Proposition 6.1 and the induction 
hypothesis instead of (l), (2), and (3) there. q 
Proof. We only need to verify that for any choice of p distinct users 
(i) fli(Z)=mT’ for k { 1, . . ..I}. and 
(ii) (p, p) satisfies the name-matching function assumption. 
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Proof of(i). Since &fli(Z) =f (ai( and ai = ai( SO by Propositions 6.1 and 
6.2, 
Proof of (ii). For any i E { 1, . . . , I}, by Propositions 6.1 and 6.2, 
pi(Z)@i_ r(Z) l g*flr(Z) T’=f(Ni(Z)) T’=f(ay(Z)) =f(&*(Z))m 
Since Ni(Z) doesn’t contain any factor dA for A E USER, f(Ni(Z)) does not 
either. Cl 
Now we can prove Theorem 6.1. 
Let (P’, p) = (p, p). Then by Proposition 6.3, (P’, p) is a well-defined p-party 
symmetric name-stamp protocol. 
We first prove that if (P, c() is insecure, so is (P’, p)- Since (P, p) is insecure, 
there exists a y E (&U C (P, Z))* such that yq(Z) = 1 for some choice of 2. By 
Propositions 6.1 and 6.2, 
f(Yal(z!)~=f(Ylf((a~!Z!)T’=f(yal(Z))T’=f(ya1(Z))=f(yal(Z))=f(l)= 1. 
Note that if R E rs, then f(n) E Tt, and if IC E C (P, Z), then f(a) E C (P’, 2). Since 
y E (rs U C (P, Z))* and f is a homomorphism, f(y) E (&U C (P’, 2)) *. Since 
f(Y!8*W! T’= 1, (P’, p) is insecure. 
We now prove that if (P’, p) is insecure, then so is (P, p). 
Since (P’, p) is insecure, there exists a y E (Ts U C (P’, Z))* such that m T’= 1 
and y has the minimum length. We first prove the following fact. 
Fact. There exists yk(I”U C(P, Z))* such that f(y’)/?,(Z)T’= 1. 
By using this Fact, we can later show that y’ is an insecure string for (P, p), SO 
(P, p) is insecure. 
Proof of Fact. In y, if each occurrence of Z?” is followed by some ‘iA’ and each OC- 
currence of DA is preceded by ‘d’, where A E USER, then y =f(y’) for some y’, and 
y’ is what we need in Fact. 
Otherwise, for some ,4 E USER, there is either an occurrence of I& in y which is 
not followed by ‘iA’, or a D4 which is not preceded by ‘d’. Let M(y) be the number 
of all such occurrences of EA and DA in y. Our ultimate purpose is to obtain a new 
insecure string S by modifying y such that M(S)=O. As long as such a 6 is found, 
we can find y’ such that d;=f(y’) and y’ is what we need in Fact. 
Without loss of generality, assume that there is an occurrence of DA which is not 
preceded by some ‘d’. Our purpose is to find a new insecure strir,g y1 for (P’, p) 
such that M(yr)<M(y). 
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Since YPI(Z)=’ = 1, this DA must cancel some EA. We use ‘DA and ‘&’ to in- 
dicate these two occurrences. Consider cases. 
Case 1: ~IEA~~L3Atjjj31(Z) “= 1. So & is not followed by ‘iA’ and L& is not 
preceded by ‘d’. Thus they are not in some operator words in C (P’U Z) but in r”s. 
If we delete them from y, then 171t772173 would be a shorter insecure string for 
(P’, p), a contradiction. So Case 1 never occurs. 
Case 2: y&(Z) = ~l~A&A&. Of course UA E &, so A E S. If & is not followed 
by VA’, then & is not in any operator word in C (P’U Z), so BA E&. By the argu- 
ment similar to Case 1, this cannot happen. So EA must be followed by iA. This iA 
must cancel some ‘d’ or ‘dA’ on the left side of d;i. Use ‘G’ and ‘a or ‘CiA) to in- 
dicate these particular occurrences. Then we have 
where d’ is either ‘d’ or ‘d& Since DA is not in any operator word in C(P’UZ), 
we can insert iAd between q; and fiA in y (DA is in y!). Then (*) becomes 
q,dtr$iAd~Aq21?A&q39 where #can be canceled by iA, d by h, DA by EA. Also y 
becomes y1 after iAd is inserted. Clearly, yI E (Ts U C (P’, Z))*, rl&(Z) = 1, and 
M(y,)&M(y)- 1. 
Now we can take yr as y and repeat he whole process to obtain ~2, and so on. 
We finally have a finite sequence of y, yl, y2, . . . , yn2 where lyi is an insecure string 
of (P’,p) for i= 1,2, . . . . n such that M(yj+ 1) CM&) and M(Y,) = 0. For yn, there 
exists a unique y’ such that r,=f(r’). This y’ is what we need in the Fact. 
Note that although yj might not be a shortest insecure string for W, p) if ill, 
Case 1 still never occurs, for otherwise we would find an insecure string shorter than 
y, a contradiction. Cl 
Now use Fact to find a y’e(&U C(P,y))* such that j@‘)&(Z) “= 1, i.e., 
fw~dm =‘= 1. Proposition 6.2 says that f(y’a&?)) = 1. By Proposition 6.1, 
f(y’a,(Z)) = 1. Since f is a one-to-one homomorphism, y’a#) = 1 and (P, p) is 
insecure. 
It remains to prove that we can effectively construct (P’, p) in linear time. This 
is true beca;lse we only need to scan each ai(Z) in P, replacing all occurrences of
DA by dD, and EA by EAiA in ai( This can be done on either a RAM machhe 
or a Turing machine in O(ra) time, where n is the total length of all ai in P. 0 
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